第17页 | How China Became Capitalist-Ronald Coase

已读89%
预计阅读本页时间：-

Pocket

Notes

Preface

1. Cheung (2008), p. 2. It is now available in both Chinese and English as Cheung (2009).

2. Hayek (1967), ch. 6.

3. Cheung (1982).

4. Ibid., p. 19.

5. Cheung (1986), p. 66.

6. Ibid., p. 79.

7. Our book is so titled because it is intended as a sequel to Cheung’s (1982, 1986) pamphlets. Terms like “capitalist” and “capitalism” are bound to invite controversy. China today remains committed to socialism, calling itself “a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.” Some readers in China may protest against our wording of the title. That China is still ruled by the Chinese Communist Party will probably lead many western readers to challenge us on our choice of title as well. Nonetheless, China has transformed over the past three decades from a broken economy where the market and entrepreneurship were banned to a vibrant one where market forces prevail and private enterprises blossom. Our book explains how this happened.

1 China at the Death of Mao

1. The Cultural Revolution was Mao’s last and most horrendous effort to mold China into socialism. Like other policy disasters, it remains a politically sensitive topic in China and the relevant government archive data are still classified and inaccessible to most scholars. For the relevant literature, see, for example, Nianyi Wang (1989); Esherick, Kickowicz, and Walder (2006); MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006); and Guo, Wang, and Han (2009), Vol. 3. A shortcoming of most historical accounts is that the voice of the victims – a conservative estimate put the human toll at 1,070,000, see Yung-fa Chen (2001), p. 846 – can hardly be heard. The courageous efforts of Dr Youqin Wang (2004), who has collected the tragic stories of 659 victims, have helped to fill the lacuna. For an early attempt along the same lines, see Jicai Feng (1990). Walder (2009) offers a fresh perspective on the most violent and cruel period (1966–1968) of the Cultural Revolution.

2. It remains an open question why Mao instigated the Cultural Revolution right after China had barely recovered from the catastrophe of the Great Leap Forward. Power struggles were clearly a factor, particularly Mao’s increasing discontent with Liu Shaoqi, who became the President of China in 1959. Nonetheless, it was the official justification to preserve socialism that gave the Cultural Revolution its distinctive ideological fever, making it an unprecedented political campaign in Chinese history. In addition, the fact that Mao at the end of his life still highly regarded the Cultural Revolution was a compelling reason against power struggles being his primary motivation.

3. The term “golden highway” was made popular by Ran Hao; he used it as the title for his four-volume novel that eulogized the socialist transformation in rural China.

4. For the most recent accounts of Mao’s great famine, see Jisheng Yang (2008) and Dikötter (2010). During the Cultural Revolution, the political campaign of anti-traditionalism and anti-intellectualism reached its peak; Chinese universities were closed, most books were banned or burned. For the early origin of anti-traditionalism in modern China, see Yu-sheng Lin (1979).

5. “Mao is Dead,” The Economist (September 11th, 1976).

6. New York Times (September 10th, 1976), section 1, p. 17.

7. World News Digest (September 11th, 1976), accessed from LexisNexis.

8. Jinglian Wu (2005), pp. 46–49; Angang Hu (2008), pp. 244–253.

9. Angang Hu (2008), pp. 512–515.

10. “Reform is China’s Second Revolution,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3. This characterization is found in a book title by Harding (1987).

11. The first section of this long poem, “Ode to Joy” (Huanle Song), was published in the People’s Daily (November 20th, 1949).

12. For the early history of the Chinese Communist Party, including the influence of the Communist International (or Comintern), see Bianco (1971); Dirlik (1989); Pantsov (2000); and Steve Smith (2000). See also the multiple volumes edited by the First Department of the Research Office of the History of the Chinese Communist Party (1997) and Chen Yung-fa (2001). For documentary accounts of the Party history, see Saich (1996) and the Research Office of the History of the Chinese Communist Party (2001).

13. The Chinese Communist Party in its early years financially depended on the Comintern; but it was uneasy with the latter’s attempt to dictate its action. Their relationship was further complicated by the presence of the Kuomintang. For the triangular relationship among Moscow, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, see Garver (1988); Heinzig (2004); Kuisong Yang (1999).

14. Chiang’s three-month visit to the Soviet Union in 1923 was a critical event in his rise to power in the Kuomintang, even though he failed to accomplish the main mission, which was to seek direct military assistance from Moscow. At the time, Chiang’s attitude toward Soviet practice was ambivalent. But compared with Sun, Chiang was clearly far less sanguine about the cooperation with the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. For the recent literature on Chiang’s visit, see Wang and Li (2004), pp. 92–94; Tianshi Yang (2008), pp. 95–145; Pakula (2009), pp. 122–124; Taylor (2009), pp. 41–45; and Heming Xing (2009), pp. 12–25. In his own retrospective account, Chiang (1956) portrayed himself as a more adamant critic of communism than he probably was.

15. Braun (1982) provided his account of the extraordinary experience he had in China as a Comintern agent.

16. Mao Zedong, “On tactics against Japanese imperialism” (a speech delivered on December 27th 1935), in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 1, p. 179.

17. The account best known to western readers was Edgar Snow (1937), which has over the years gone through several revisions, with more chapters added.

18. The complicated relationship between Stalin and Mao, particularly Stalin’s early disdain toward Mao, has been well documented. See, for example, Radchenko (2009), p. 5. See also Kuisong Yang (1999).

19. For a recent account of the “Long March,” see Shuyun Sun (2006).

20. For an authoritative account of Mao’s consolidation of leadership during the Yan’an period, see Hua Gao (2000). For early treatments of the rise of the “Yan’an Way” and its transformative impact on the Chinese Communist Party, see Selden (1971, 1995) and Yung-fa Chen (1990).

21. On Mao’s first visit to Moscow and meeting with Stalin, see Radchenko (2009), pp. 3–9. For the Chinese source, see Pang and Jin (2003), pp. 28–58.

22. It is still hard to gauge why Mao, a grand strategist with a defiant mind, would bind China to a foreign policy that he called “leaning toward one side.” It was this misstep that gradually set Mao’s China down a disastrous path (e.g., a military conflict with the United States on the Korean peninsula, economic and political isolation from the West, and a rush to socialism).

23. The major component of China’s first Five Year Plan was the so-called “156 projects” – 156 industrial projects supported by Soviet technology and loans, which became the “cornerstone” of China’s industrial development. See, for example, Dong and Wu (2004).

24. It is not entirely clear when and how communism ceased to be a tool and became embraced as an ultimate goal. For Mao’s decision to take China to Stalinism, see Hua-yu Li (2006).

25. The literature on Mao’s China is overwhelming and grows fast, partly due to the increasing recognition that China after Mao cannot be severed from Mao’s China. A convenient starting point is the last two volumes of The Cambridge History of China edited by MacFarquhar and Fairbank (1987, 1991). Meisner (1999) and Gray (1990, 2006) provide some of the best accounts offered by historians. Bramall (2009) provides an account of the Chinese political economy since 1949, with equal coverage of Mao and post-Mao eras. Naughton’s (2007) work has a fair amount of coverage of Mao’s China, even though its focus is on the reform period. For an earlier account, see Riskin (1987). For the Chinese literature, the three-volume series on Mao’s China (1949–1976) – Lin, Fan and Zhang (1989); Jin Cong (1989); and Nianyi Wang (1989) – is a useful starting point. For a comprehensive coverage, see the ten-volume series on the history of the People’s Republic (1949–1981), published by the Chinese University of Hong Kong. In addition, the first three volumes of the five-volume series, Zhonggua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanti Shi Gao [The Thematic History of the People’s Republic of China], published by Sichuan People’s Press (2004), provide a fairly balanced and focused coverage of major events during Mao’s era. For historical accounts of Mao’s economy, see Jian Sun (1992); Li Wu (1999); Shaozhi Su (2002); and Angang Hu (2008). The most comprehensive account available is the five-volume series edited by Dexin Zhao (1988–1999). See also Ning Wang (2008) for a critical assessment of Mao’s economy.

26. Hinton (1990).

27. See, for example, Meisner (1999); Angang Hu (2008); Bramall (2009).

28. Lerner (1944), p. 1.

29. For origins of the policy, see Walker (1984); Yibo Bo (1997), pp. 180–199; and Yunhui Lin (2009), pp. 90–116.

30. China’s household registration system is one of the few institutions that have so far survived the three decades of reform. See Tiejun Cheng and Selden (1994) and Fei-ling Wang (2005).

31. Even though it was and continues to be hailed as a success, land reform set a vicious example of employing brutal force and fanning hatred dressed in the rhetoric of class struggle in policy implementation. Pinghan Luo (2005), pp. 173–221 reveals that many arbitrary and inhumane measures adopted during land reform against the landlords and rich peasants would foreshadow the terror of the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese communists’ “preoccupation with hatred coupled with an enthusiasm for singling out enemies” was identified by the late political scientist Lucian Pye (1992, p. 67) as the dominant theme in Mao’s politics. According to Pye, “No other political culture places as much stress upon the emotion of hate as does the Chinese” (ibid.).

32. For a recent reflection on Mao’s agricultural policy, see Kueh (2006).

33. Jisheng Yang (1998), p. 17.

34. Jisheng Yang (2004), p. 40.

35. For the death of Liu Shaoqi, see Zheng Huang (2004), pp. 155–176.

36. Vogel (2010) provides a meticulously documented biography of Deng, with a focus on his last two decades.

37. For Zhu Rongji’s dramatic rise to power, see Hancheng Zhou (2003).

38. For Steven Cheung’s visit to Beijing and his encounter with Chinese officials in the early 1980s, see Cheung (2009), p. 101.

39. For Mao’s life, including his rise to power, see Spence (1999); Short (1999); and Mao’s official biography, edited by Chongji Jin (1996) and by Pang and Jin (2003). Cheng-tung Wei (1999) attempts an account of Mao’s life from the perspective of modern psychology. A well-known episode that best reveals Mao’s intolerant and vengeful personality was his dealing with Zhang Shenfu, one of the early founders of the Chinese Communist Party and his boss at Peking University; for Zhang’s life, see Schwarcz (1992). See also Rui Li (1999); Hua Gao (2000); and Ruoshui Wang (2001).

40. For Mao’s adventurous and rebellious student life in Changsha, see Spence (1999), pp. 16–30; Short (1999), pp. 39–81; and Chongji Jin (1996), pp. 15–39.

41. To describe his humiliating experience at Peking University, Mao, many years later, reminisced that “[M]y office was so low that people avoided me. One of my tasks was to register the names of people who came to read newspapers, but to most of them I did not exist as a human being. Among those who came to read, I recognized the names of famous leaders of the [Chinese] ‘renaissance’ movement, men . . . in whom I was intensely interested. I tried to begin conversations with them on political and cultural subjects, but they were very busy men. They had no time to listen to an assistant librarian speaking a southern dialect.” Quoted in Short (1999), p. 83. One of these busy men that Mao mentioned resentfully was Fu Ssu-nien (Fu Shi Nian), who would visit Mao in Yan’an right before the outbreak of the civil war and later flee to Taiwan to rebuild the National Taiwan University. After 1949, Fu was denounced as a war criminal and the tombs of his ancestors were destroyed. See Fan-Sen Wang (2000) for an account of Fu’s colorful personality and extraordinary life.

42. Chinese intellectuals at the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 were bitterly divided in their attitude toward the communist regime (e.g., Fu (2010)). Some left for Hong Kong or Taiwan as they feared that the Communists, emboldened by socialism, would not tolerate the Chinese traditional culture or leave any room for intellectual freedom. Many stayed to embrace wholeheartedly the new China, but quickly found themselves the target of Mao’s “thought reform” and political campaigns, e.g., Ningkun Wu (1993) and Junyi Wei (1998).

43. For the life story of Qian Xuesen, see Iris Chang (1995).

44. Immediately after the founding of the People’s Republic, a political campaign was launched to “re-educate” the intellectuals and instill in them the doctrine of Marxism. This marked the beginning of the closing of a free market for ideas in the People’s Republic of China. For many chilling accounts, see Ningkun Wu (1994); Junyi Wei (1998); Yiliang Zhou (1998); Zuguang Wu (2004); Kedi Liu (2005); and Rongzu Wang (2005).

45. Balazs (1964), p. 6, for example, called “the uninterrupted continuity of a ruling class of scholar-officials” in Imperial China “one enduring feature of Chinese society.” Qian Mu coined a new term, “scholars-run-government” (Shi Ren Zheng Fu), to refer to the traditional Chinese political system. See Mu Qian (2001), p. 15 and Ying-shih Yu (2004).

46. The Communist Party and Confucian scholar-officials represent two contrasting types of organizations. The former exemplifies a hierarchically structured organization where order is imposed from above, while the latter comes close to what Polanyi (1966) called a “society of explorers” where authority emerges out of the common pursuit of knowledge.

47. Liang Shuming provided a good example. See Shuming Liang (2004), p. 139.

48. For Liang’s confrontation with Mao, see Shuming Liang (2004), pp. 146–155. See also Alitto (1979); Kedi Liu (2005); and Liang and Alitto (2009).

49. See Jiandong Lu (1995) for Chen’s two decades of life struggle for intellectual independence. See also Rongzu Wang (2005).

50. For the tragedy of Hu Feng, see Hui Li (2003).

51. The Anti-Rightist Movement violently ended a fragile market for ideas in the People’s Republic, imprisoning many who had followed Mao’s call to criticize the government and Party policy. For its origins and consequences, see the relevant chapters in Guo, Wang and Han (2004), Vol. 2; Zheng Zhu (1998); and Zhihua Shen (2008). For a personal account, see Yangxiang Shao (2007). The chain of events that led to the Anti-Rightist Movement is widely known. A remaining point of debate is whether Mao changed his mind in the middle of the “Double Hundred Movement” and turned against the critics of the Party, a position held by the Chinese government, or whether Mao intentionally designed the “Double Hundred Movement” as a “strategic plot” to snare non-Party members whom Mao deemed a potential challenge to the one-party rule. Nonetheless, both sides agree that the Anti-Rightist Movement registered a critical turning point in the history of the People’s Republic. After the collectivization of the private sector and the oppression of the market for ideas, China was set on its tragic path to self-destruction.

52. Yibo Bo (1997), pp. 438–439.

53. For the rivalry between Mao and Khrushchev, see Luthi (2008) and Radchenko (2009).

54. Mao (1977), “On the Ten Major Relationships,” pp. 284–307, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. 5.

55. Ibid., p. 290.

56. Ibid., p. 291.

57. Ibid., p. 292.

58. Ibid., p. 294.

59. Ibid.

60. Jinglian Wu (2005), pp. 43–57; Yibo Bo (1997), pp. 548–565.

61. Angang Hu (2008), p. 250.

62. The Great Leap Forward was widely recognized as the first policy disaster under Mao. It has recently attracted a lot of attention. China Economic Review (1998) published a special issue, 9(2), on China’s great famine during the Great Leap Forward. For a full historical account, see Jisheng Yang (2008) and Dikotter (2010). For a popular account, see Becker (1998). For a recent investigation of the Great Leap Forward in a Henan village, see Thaxton (2008).

63. Yibo Bo (1997), pp. 478–510.

64. People’s Daily (August 27th, 1958).

65. Pinghan Luo (2001).

66. Ibid., pp. 61–65.

67. People’s Daily (September 18th, 1958).

68. Qian Xuesen, China Youth Daily (June 16th, 1958).

69. Jian Sun (1992), p. 244.

70. Ibid.

71. Yibo Bo (1997), pp. 466–489; Yunhui Lin (2008), p. 12.

72. Wei Li and Dennis Tao Yang (2005).

73. Adam Smith (1976 [1776]), Book IV, p. 33.

74. At what was commonly referred to as “the Seven-Thousand-Attendee Meeting” (from January 11th to February 7th, 1962), Liu expressed in public his different diagnosis of the cause of the great famine during the Great Leap Forward. This disagreement with, and implied criticism against, Mao made Liu a major target in Mao’s launch of the Cultural Revolution. See, for example, Jin Cong (1989), p. 299; Shuhua Zhang (2006), pp. 277–288.

75. Hayek (1937).

76. See, for example, references given in note 1.

77. Li Wu (1999), pp. 650–658.

78. For the tension between junxian and fengjian as two competing political systems in Chinese history, see Mu Qian (2005), pp. 1–37, 38–56; Schrecker (2004), chs. 1 and 2. For the origin and development of fengjian, see Tianyu Feng (2006).

2 China in Transition

1. For the power struggle between Hua and the Gang of Four as well as the ideological divide between them and Deng and his associates, see Chuntao Xie (2008); Cheng, Wang, and Li (2008); Liu and Xu (2009); Donglian Xiao (2008); and Jisheng Yang (1998), ch. 2.

2. Spence (1999), p. 178.

3. For the arrest of the Gang of Four and the critical role played by Hua, see Xichen Ji (2000); Gensheng Zhang (2004); and Dongling Chen (2004), pp. 567–592; Shi and Li (2008), pp. 668–707; Gang Han (2011).

4. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006).

5. After taking office, Hua repeatedly emphasized the development of “productive force” as the first priority. See, for example, Cheng, Wang, and Li (2008), pp. 72–75.

6. For Hua’s appointment of Hu Yaobang and Hu Jiwei, see respectively, Mei Man (2005), pp. 212–213 and Jiwei Hu (1997), pp. 29–30.

7. e.g., Huang Dai (1998).

8. Jisheng Yang (1998), pp. 164–165.

9. The passage in 1981 of the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” was meant to “confirm the historical role of Comrade Mao Zedong and explain the necessity to uphold and develop Mao Zedong Thought,” as Deng Xiaoping (1981) put it. See Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2. A comprehensive and truthful evaluation of Mao was not even attempted because the priority then was to “unite the Party” and “look to the future.”

10. For Hu’s leading role in political reform during the early 1980s, see Baoxiang Shen (1997) and Cheng, Wang, and Li (2008), pp. 85–121.

11. That Hu’s efforts were supported, or at least, tolerated by Hua was an important factor for their success. See Gang Han (2004), pp. 29–47. Jiwei Hu (1997), pp. 84–85 also recognizes Hua as an “open-minded and democratic” leader.

12. This approach to reform was consistent with traditional Chinese practice, in which change in personnel was as important as institutional change in enacting political reform. See, for example, Mu Qian (2001), pp. 1–2 for a brief exposition of these two strategies of political reform.

13. Li Wu (1999), pp. 756–807; Dali Sun (2004).

14. Harding (1987), pp. 53–57; Jisheng Yang (1998), pp. 108–110; Meisner (1999), p. 429.

15. For the origin and rise of “four modernizations” as an economic policy, see Yaguang Han (2006), pp. 65–70.

16. For Deng’s revitalization of “four modernizations” in 1975, see Hua Zhang (2004).

17. See “We regard reform as a revolution,” a talk Deng gave on October 10th, 1984, in his meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is available in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3.

18. e.g., Shi and Li (2008).

19. Yu and Wang (2004). But the whole incidence remains murky. As acknowledged by the authors at the very beginning, the Lin Biao incidence is “one of the strangest” events in the history of the People’s Republic (p. 302).

20. Congji Jin (1996), p. 1610.

21. Jisheng Yang (1998), pp. 55–63; Jieshe An (2004).

22. Hua Zhang (2004); Angang Hu (2008), pp. 477–485; Peng and Chen (2008), pp. 125–128; Shi and Li (2008), pp. 527–558.

23. Shi and Li (2008), p. 583.

24. People’s Daily (December 26th, 1976).

25. As pointed out by Li Wu (1999), for example, “In fact, national economic construction in 1977 and 1978 had achieved a relatively steady and fast development” (p. 763).

26. Muqiao Xue (1996), p. 7.

27. Jinhua Chen (2005), p. 95.

28. Cheng, Wang, and Li (2008), p. 161.

29. The calculation is based on statistics data provided in Li Wu (1999).

30. Perkins (1991), p. 496.

31. Jinhua Chen (2005), p. 98.

32. Ibid., pp 105–106.

33. This open door policy was preceded by two previous attempts. During the first Five Year Plan (1953–1957), China, with loans from the Soviet Union, imported a significant amount of equipment from the Soviet bloc. In 1972, China bought from Japan and Western Europe equipment in steel, chemical, and fertilizer production lines and power generators to modernize its industrial structure. This was the first time in the history of the People’s Republic that China opened its door to western capitalist economies. See Jinhua Chen (2005), pp. 10–14. It is noteworthy that Hua was a co-author of a 1972 proposal submitted to the State Economic Council to import chemical and fertilizer production equipment. See Yan Li (2008), p. 150.

34. Li Wu (1999), p. 776.

35. But China had started trading with the West since the early 1970s. An article in People’s Daily (September 19th, 1978) reported that the Beijing Second Sweater Plant borrowed 1.3 million USD from a bank to buy weaving machines from abroad in May 1975. In 1976, the plant earned 4 million USD from exports.

36. People’s Daily (January 2nd, 1977).

37. Yan Li (2008), p. 134.

38. Jisheng Yang (1998), pp. 110–111; Li Wu (1999), pp. 776–777; Jinhua Chen (2005), pp. 145–151.

39. Cheng, Wang, and Li (2008), pp. 59–84.

40. Li Wu (1999), p. 758.

41. Hua (1978), “Unite and Strive to Build a Modern Powerful Socialist Country: Report to the Fifth National People’s Congress,” Peking Review, no. 10 (March 10th), p. 39.

42. Milton Friedman (1984), p. 26.

43. Cheng, Wang, and Li (2008), pp. 122–132; Yan Li (2008), pp. 68–96; Yang and Chen (2009), pp. 153–179.

44. Yan Li (2008), p. 69.

45. Ibid., pp. 76–80.

46. Guangyuan Yu (2008), p. 55.

47. Yang and Chen (2009), pp. 153–167.

48. Ibid., pp. 168–179.

49. Lee (2000), p. 645.

50. Deng , Ma, Sun, and Wu (1979).

51. Richard Wong (2008), p. 4.

52. Mingming Tu (2008).

53. Cheung (1982, 1986).

54. The 1978 Communiqué is widely available online in both Chinese and English. It was collected in Harold Hinton (1982), pp 457–462.

55. Ibid., p. 459.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., p. 460.

58. Ibid., p. 459.

59. Ibid., pp. 459–460.

60. Ibid., p. 460.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 459.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. In the official English translation, “market” appeared twice in “market price,” which should rather be “sale price” in contrast to “factory price.”

66. The 1978 Communiqué, in Hinton (1982), p. 462.

3 How China’s Market Reform Began

1. It is striking that almost all writings on China’s economic reform agree that the reform had a clear and clean start. For most, China’s “post-Mao reform” and “post-1978 reform” are inter-exchangeable. We find this consensus puzzling and misleading in many ways.

2. Baoxiang Shen (2004), p. 71; Licheng Ma (2008), pp. 6–15.

3. The 1978 Communiqué, in Hinton (1982), p. 459.

4. Ibid.

5. Donglian Xiao (2004), p. 189.

6. Jianguo Gao (2000), pp. 377–392.

7. Ibid., pp. 411–427.

8. Jinglian Wu (2003), p. 52.

9. Ibid., p. 138; Peng and Chen (2008), p. 89.

10. People’s Daily (February 19th, 1979). See also Donglian Xiao (2008), pp. 507–544. It is noteworthy that this section of Xiao’s book is simply titled “The Reform of the Economic System Began as Delegating Rights and Sharing Profits.” As Xiao put it, “At least during 1978–1980, the focus of reform was always placed on the expansion of enterprises’ autonomy” (p. 522).

11. Li Wu (1999), pp. 841–846; Jinglian Wu (2003), pp. 138–144; Donglian Xiao (2004), p. 191.

12. Jisheng Yang (1998), p. 358; Li Wu (1999), p. 842.

13. Li Wu (1999), p. 842.

14. Shirk (1993), p. 200.

15. Jinglian Wu (2005), p. 145.

16. This is what is called M-form (multi-divisional) industrial structure in the research literature (e.g., Qian and Xu (1993); Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000); and Qian, Roland, and Xu (2006)), in contrast to the U-form structure that characterized the former Soviet economy.

17. Donglian Xiao (2004), p. 204.

18. Kuang and Gai (2004), pp. 311–312.

19. Han Zong (2007), pp. 30–41; Peng and Chen (2008), pp. 125–128.

20. For example, it is not discussed in Jinglian Wu (2003, 2010) or Naughton (2007).

21. Naughton (1995). As Naughton (p. 8) points out, the term may mean two distinctive approaches. First, it refers to a conscious strategy of reform pursued by the Chinese government; it is to keep central planning fixed and allow market forces to grow so that over time “the plan would becomes proportionately less and less important until the economy gradually grew out of the plan” (ibid). Second, it could mean that the Chinese economy evolved in ways that the policymakers did not anticipate and “the economy and its reform both developed ‘out of plan’ ” (p. 23). The first interpretation seems to be what Naughton endorses and it has gained much acceptance in the literature (p. 8), even though Naughton admits that the phrase he coined “may be understood” in the second fashion (pp. 22–23). Now we believe that the first approach may capture part of the reform dictated by the Chinese government – such as enterprise reform – but the overall process of reform is better described by the second approach.

22. Jinglian Wu (2005), pp. 68–71. The best known economic analysis which endorses the practice is provided by Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000). For an early rather critical assessment, see Wu and Zhao (1987).

23. The data can be found in Muqiao Xue (1996), pp. 281–282.

24. This case of private farming can be found in Gan Wei Tian Xia Xiang [Bold to Be the First in the World] (edited by the Provincial Propaganda Department of the Party in Sichuan, Provincial Academy of Social Sciences in Sichuan, and Sichuan Daily, 2008), a collection of economic experiments that first emerged in Sichuan province.

25. The story of Xiaogang village in Anhui province is widely documented, in both Chinese and English. For detailed coverage of agricultural reform in Anhui, see Anhui Nongcun Gaige Zi Lu [The Road of Agricultural Reform in Anhui] (2006) and Anhui Nongcun Gaige Kou Shu Shi [The Oral History of Agricultural Reform in Anhui] (2006), both edited by the Research Office of the Party History of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee.

26. The agreement reads: “We distribute land to households, to which the head of each household has agreed by signing his signature or affixing his seal. If this works, each household pledges to pay its share of the required agricultural tax in grain to the State and not to ask for money or grain from the State any more. If this does not work, we cadres are willing to be condemned to prison or even death, and commune members collectively pledge to raise our children to the age of 18.” It can be found in Jinglian Wu (2005), p. 111.

27. See Lianshen Song (2005) for an account of the rise and fall of Dazhai.

28. Unlike Wan and Zhao, both of them were later promoted to Beijing, Chi and his pioneering role in reform in Guizhou was rarely known even in China. But see Runshen Du (1998), pp. 268–298.

29. People’s Daily (March 15th, 1979).

30. For a detailed account of the critical role Wan Li played in promoting private farming, see Zhang and Ding (2006), pp. 154–231. See also Niansun Qian (2008).

31. See Zhengfu Shi (2008) for a version of the official account. According to Wu Xiang, a journalist at the People’s Daily, the case of private farming was far from confined to the Xiaogang village, but widespread in China. Chi Biqing, the Party chief at Guizhou province from 1978 to 1985, stated that by May 1978, more than 10 percent of production teams in his province had already embraced some form of private farming. Both can be found in Runshen Du (1998), pp. 214 and 269, respectively. As one of the poorest provinces in China, Guizhou under the leadership of Chi was probably the earliest to embrace province-wide private farming.

32. For example, see Yougui Zheng (2009), p. 233 .

33. Jinglian Wu (2005), p. 112.

34. Runshen Du (1998), p. 214.

35. Xiaochun Fan (2009). See also Runshen Du (1998), pp. 16–79; Angang Hu (2008), pp. 341–345.

36. Xiaochun Fan (2009), pp. 382–384.

37. Tsou (1986), pp. 198–211; Zweig (1997), pp. 55–56.

38. In a detailed case study of a village in Jiangsu province, Huaiyin Li (2009) showed that decollectivization was “primarily a top-down process planned and imposed by the state” (p. 268).

39. For a classical empirical investigation of the importance of organizations in economic life, see Banfield (1967). For an early emphasis on business enterprise in the rise of capitalism, see Weber (1981). For modern treatments of the subject, see Arrow (1974); Williamson (1985); and Coleman (1990).

40. The production team as organizational capital may survive in different manners. See Ning Wang (2005), ch. 5, for an example.

41. See Chung (2000) for a comparative study of provincial differences in the implementation of the household responsibility system.

42. Huaiyin Li (2009) provides an illustrative example. Even the household responsibility system was met with resistance from the villagers, Li concludes by stating that “The most significant achievement of the rural reform after 1980, . . ., was not the remarkable increase in agricultural production, as the reform designers originally intended, but the unexpected emancipation of the rural labor force and the consequent diversification of income sources of the rural population” (p. 290).

43. The literature on township and village enterprises is massive. See Xu and Zhang (2008) for a recent review.

44. Deng Xiaoping, “We Shall Speed up Reform,” Talk with Stefan Korosec, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, June 12th, 1987. Available from Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3.

45. Li Wu (1999), p. 792.

46. e.g., Wei Li and Dennis Tao Yang (2005).

47. e.g., Muqiao Xue (2008), p. 19.

48. e.g., Lanqing Li (2008), pp. 28–29.

49. Naughton (2007), p. 274.

50. Xu and Zhang (2008). For a general discussion of the township and village enterprises, see Findlay, Watson, and Wu (1994).

51. Naughton (2007), pp. 274–275.

52. Yasheng Huang (2008), p. 10.

53. Quoted from Jisheng Yang (2009), p. 297.

54. Yasheng Huang (2008), p. 77.

55. At a 1985 conference held in Japan, a Japanese scholar proclaimed that modern enterprise did not exist in China. This comment resonated strongly with Chinese economists in the audience and quickly attracted a lot of attention in China. Quoted from Jinglian Wu (2003), p. 135.

56. Findlay, Watson, and Xu (1994), p. 19.

57. For a detailed historical account of the event, see Yizhuang Ding (2008) and Xiaomeng Liu (2008).

58. For an insightful account of Chinese danwei, see Walder (1986). For a more updated account, see Lu and Perry (1997). For an early but still useful reference, see Schurmann (1968).

59. Licheng Ma (2005), p. 147.

60. Donglian Xiao (2008), p. 621.

61. Muqiao Xue (1996), pp. 268–272.

62. Licheng Ma (2005), p. 150.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., p. 151.

65. A Chinese economist by the name of Lin Zili, based on an example given in Marx’s Das Capital, concluded that an employer, when hiring eight workers or above, would engage in capitalistic exploration and therefore should be prohibited. Quoted in Licheng Ma (2005), p. 178.

66. For the tale of Wenzhen, see Jinglong Ma (2008) and Xingzhong Qian (2008).

67. What follows is primarily based on Hong Chen (2006); Mingtian Xu (2008); and Qiao Tu (2008). See also Donglian Xiao (2008), pp. 757–778.

68. Hong Kong benefited greatly from the exodus of human talents and capital from the mainland before and after 1949. At a time when entrepreneurship was attacked in the mainland, Hong Kong provided a safe shelter. Later it was from Hong Kong that human and financial capital first returned when China reopened its arms to capitalism, see Richard Wong (2008).

69. See Hong Chen (2006), pp. 24–27.

70. Ibid., p. 7; Mingtian Xu (2008), pp. 5–6.

71. Hong Chen (2006), p. 8.

72. For example, Gang Deng (1997).

73. Another rationale attributed to Chen Yun to exclude Shanghai was that the whole Yangzi Delta region “was famous for its opportunists who would, with their consummate skills, emerge from their cages if given the slightest chance” (Ziyang Zhao (2009), p. 102) . Zhao’s observation adds another testimony to Chen’s complicated role in China’s reform.

74. Hong Chen (2006), p. 12.

75. Hu’s early revolutionary experiences had a formative impact on him. Hu was a victim during the Anti-Bolshevik League incident (1930–1931) when he was still a teenager (Mei Man (2000), pp. 50–51). Hu was saved at the last minute when a large number of Red Army officers were executed after being accused of belonging to the Kuomintang intelligence agency “Anti-Bolshevik League.” Later, Hu was involved in the Yan’an “Rectification Movement” (1941–1945) (Yung-fa Chen (1990), pp. xx; Hua Gao (2000), p. 517; see also Mei Man (2000), p. 63), when many intellectuals who had been attracted to Yan’an and Party members were imprisoned as suspected spies of the Kuomintang. These early incidents and his suffering during the Cultural Revolution must have convinced Hu that the Party’s use of terror and political control of thought had only damaged the long-term cause of the Party (e.g., Li, Hu, Xie, et al. (2009)). This conviction placed Hu apart from other Chinese leaders.

76. Deng Xiaoping, “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3.

77. Ziyang Zhao (2009), pp. 203–206 proposed that China was at the “initial stage of socialism” so that it could free itself from the constraints of orthodox socialist doctrines, legitimizing many reform experiments that were inconsistent with socialism.

4 A Bird in the Cage: Market Reform under Socialism

1. Licheng Ma (2005), pp. 150–152.

2. Li Wu (1999), p. 886.

3. Chung (2000); Zhengfu Shi (2008).

4. Xu and Zhang (2008).

5. For a succinct description of the major problems China’s state-owned enterprises faced, see Granick (1990), pp. 25–31.

6. Muqiao Xue (1996), pp. 272–277.

7. Ibid., pp. 273–274.

8. Ibid., p. 277.

9. For Chinese politics during this time period, see, for example, Shirk (1993); Fewsmith (1994); and Jisheng Yang (2004).

10. For Chen’s economic thinking and the critical role he played under Mao and Deng, see Lardy and Lieberthal (1983); Liu and Xu (2009). As admitted by Ziyang Zhao (2009) in his biography, “Chen Yun was enormously influential within the Communist Party and in economic policy” (p. 122).

11. Donglian Xiao et al. (1999), pp. 93–95.

12. An alternative view would see the cage as a shelter for the economy. This reinterpretation would make Chen’s view broadly compatible with the working of the market economy, where the role of the state is to protect and facilitate the market, rather than restrict market forces.

13. Hu Yaobang, “Report to the 12th Party Congress,” People’s Daily (September 8th, 1982).

14. Quoted from Ziyang Zhao (2009), p. 103. See also Li Wu (1999), p. 852.

15. Jisheng Yang (2004), pp. 275–285; Ziyang Zhao (2009), pp. 162–168.

16. Licheng Ma (2005), pp. 162–166; Yasheng Huang (2008), pp. 50–51.

17. Licheng Ma, pp. 175–177; see also Jinglong Ma (2008) and Xingzhong Qian (2008).

18. Peng and Chen (2008), p. 138.

19. Yao (2008) called the Chinese government in the reform era a “disinterested government.” This description fits the early period of reform better.

20. Jisheng Yang (2004), pp. 341–342.

21. But Chinese politics remained institutionally unstable, as later demonstrated by the nonprocedural removal from office of both Hu and his successor, Zhao Ziyang.

22. Jisheng Yang (2004), pp. 188–189 and 196–199.

23. Muqiao Xue (1996), pp. 297–298.

24. Peng and Chen (2008), p. 180; Yasheng Huang (2008), p. 97.

25. Wong (1988), p. 11.

26. Japan Economic Journal (May 29th, 1984).

27. Business Week (October 15th, 1984).

28. Deng Xiaoping, “Reform and Opening to the Outside World Are a Great Experiment,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3.

29. Deng Xiaoping, “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai, January 18th, February 21st, 1992,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3.

30. See, for example, Ziyang Zhao (2009), p. 101.

31. People’s Daily (July 21st, 1992).

32. Another similarity shared by them was rather unfortunate. Deng was as keen to hold on to political power as Chen was to economic centralization. Nonetheless, the differences between Deng and Chen were many and significant. For example, they held almost opposite views on the speed of reform and foreign capital – for the latter, see Ziyang Zhao (2009), p. 102.

33. Peng and Chen (2008), pp. 189–192.

34. 1984 Decision on the Economic System Reform, its Chinese version available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/134902/8092122.html.

35. Muqiao Xue (1996), p. 310.

36. Li Wu (1999), pp. 908–912; Peng and Chen (2008), pp. 214–218. For a diagnosis of China’s pricing system prior to price reform, see Furen Dong (1986) .

37. Before price reform, the Chinese government thought prices could be ‘scientifically” calculated if a powerful computing machine was available. The State Council appointed Xue Muqiao in 1981 to lead a team of more than 50 economists to use input–output data and the most advanced computers bought abroad to calculate theoretical prices. See Weiying Zhang (2010), p. 200.

38. For the debate between proponents of the two approaches, see Weiying Zhang (2008) and Jun Zhang (2010), pp. 3–30.

39. Peng and Chen (2008), p. 209.

40. Jinglian Wu (2003), p. 65.

41. e.g., Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000).

42. Peng and Chen (2008), p. 240.

43. Ibid., pp. 240–241.

44. Ibid., pp. 243–244.

45. Ibid., p. 196.

46. Ibid., pp. 196–197.

47. Ibid., p. 198.

48. For changes in China’s financial system, see Riedel, Jin, and Gao (2007) as well as Allen, Qian, and Qian (2008). For a concise view of China’s banking system up to the mid-1980s, see Zhou and Zhu (1987).

49. Quoted in Jinglian Wu (2005), pp. 190–191.

50. Kraay (2000). Wu Jinglian’s estimate (2005), p. 191 puts the household saving as high as 83 percent during the 1990s, which is probably too high an estimate. But the steady increase of household saving since the late 1970s, in both absolute terms and relative to enterprise and government saving, is well documented.

51. For a classic formulation and analysis of the problem, see Kornai (1979, 1980, 1986). For a systematic analysis of the role of Chinese local governments in investment, see Yasheng Huang (1996). For a more updated account, see Shih (2007).

52. The following is based on Muqiao Xue (1996), pp. 312–319; Li Wu (1999), p. 948; Jinglian Wu (2010), pp. 339–342.

53. Muqiao Xue (1996), p. 313.

54. Ibid., p. 316–317.

55. Ibid., p. 324.

56. Jisheng Yang (1998), p. 394; Peng and Chen (2008), p. 319.

57. Peng and Chen (2008) p. 321. For its political ramification, see Ziyang Zhao (2009), pp. 223–234.

58. The following is based on Jisheng Yang (2004); Ruoshui Wang (1997); and Jiwei Hu (1997). See also Fewsmith (1994).

59. See also Ziyang Zhao (2009), pp. 161–166.

60. But the decision to remove Hu was made by a few Party veterans, including Deng and Chen, rather than the official Party organ, blatantly violating the constitution of the Party. This incident began a series of actions in the following years that would critically undermine the political legitimacy of the Party and gradually turn the Party into a powerful interest group. No longer united by a common political belief, the Party would resort to material interests to hold on to power. While this transformation would depoliticize the Party and weaken its ideological commitment, it would also delay political reform and open the economy to the infiltration of political forces.

61. For a book-length sociological account of the 1989 Students Movement, see Dingxin Zhao (2001).

62. Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000).

63. David Hume, as quoted by Hirschman (1977), wrote “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (p. 24).

64. See, for example, Coase (1959, 1961); Alchian (1961); Alchian and Demsetz (1973); and Barzel (1997). For the impact of property rights economics on Chinese economic reform, see, for example, Geng Xiao (1997); Cheung (2009); and Qiren Zhou (2008). See also Jun Zhang (1991).

65. See, for example, Schotter (1981); Coase (1984, 1988); Williamson (1985); Bromley (1989); North (1990); Ostrom (1990); Powell and DiMaggio (1991); Brinton and Nee (1998); Menard and Shirley (2005); and Mahoney and Thelen (2010).

66. In the past, disagreement with the Party line was regarded as the highest treason. This practice essentially ruled out any meaningful debate between Party lines. This imposed uniformity might have helped to bring the Party to power, but it became a deadly liability for a ruling party.

67. For a discussion of the role of economists in policymaking under Mao and the early years of reform, see a doctoral dissertation by Halpern (1985). See also Donglian Xiao (2008), pp. 458–465 and 511–516. For changes up to the 1990s, see Naughton (2002). For a most recent study of China’s various think tanks and their influences on government policy, see Xuefeng Zhu (2009).

68. Jisheng Yang (1998), pp. 324–325; (2004), pp. 195–199.

69. For legal reforms in China, see Lubman (2000); Peerenboom (2002); Ruoying Chen (2008); and Potter (2008). For “restricted” reform in Chinese courts, see Liebman (2007).

70. Deng Xiaoping, “Neither Democracy nor the Legal System Should Be Weakened,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2.

71. Quoted in Raphael Shen (2000), p. ix.

72. Gilboy and Read (2008), p. 155.

73. Clark, Murrell, and Whiting (2008), p. 381.

74. For this and other indicators of legal development, see Jingwen Zhu (2007).

75. Alfred (1999), p. 193.

76. Hong Chen (2006), pp. 19–23; Donglian Xiao (2008), pp. 766–768.

77. For China’s cadre management system and Beijing’s use of personnel appointments to control local governments, see Manion (1985) and Chan (2004). Chenggang Xu (2009) coined a new term, a “regionally decentralized authoritarian system,” to refer to Beijing’s tight personnel control and economic decentralization.

5 Growing out of Socialism: Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics

1. Peng and Chen (2008), pp. 321–323.

2. Li Wu (1999), p. 980.

3. The Guardian (March 21st, 1989).

4. Newsweek (June 19th, 1989).

5. The Economist (October 28th, 1989).

6. Washington Post (June 29th, 1990).

7. Licheng Ma (2008), p. 149.

8. e.g., Shirk (1993); Gordon White (1993).

9. Li Peng, “Interview with Western German Newspaper Reported,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 25th, 1989, accessed at LexisNexis.

10. “Premier Li Peng Addresses the National Planning Conference,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 29th, 1989. All three quotations can be found in the text, accessed at LexisNexis.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. People’s Daily (February 22nd, 1990).

15. This conference is well documented in Chinese. See, for example, Jun Zhang (2010), pp. 41–65.

16. Muqiao Xue (1996), pp. 319–326.

17. Xiaobo Wu (2010), pp. 147–148; Muqiao Xue (1996), p. 336.

18. People’s Daily (December 7th, 1990).

19. Deng Xiaoping (June 9th, 1989), Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3.

20. Deng Xiaoping (June 16th, 1989), in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol.3.

21. “Jiang Zemin on Anniversary of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone,” BBC Summary of World Broadcast, November 28th, 1990, accessed at LexisNexis.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Peng and Chen (2008), pp. 353–356.

26. Ibid., pp. 360–364.

27. Ibid., pp. 254–259.

28. Ibid., pp. 256–258. See also “Chinese Get Wall Street Guide to Capitalist Road,” New York Times (November 12th, 1986).

29. Peng and Chen (2008), pp. 364–368.

30. Ibid., p. 366.

31. Ibid., p. 368.

32. Jisheng Yang (1998), pp. 509–510.

33. Peng and Chen (2008), p. 375.

34. Ibid.

35. See Muqiao Xue (1996), p. 356.

36. People’s Daily (September 2nd, 1991).

37. Ibid.

38. People’s Daily (October 23rd, 1991).

39. As revealed in Vogel’s (2010) recent account, Deng was still able to summon Jiang Zemin and Li Peng – at least twice in 1990 (March 3rd and December 24th), but his words “had little effect” (p. 667).

40. For the first report in China of Deng’s southern tour, see “Spring Wind Blows East – Deng Xiaoping in Shenzhen,” which first appeared in the Shenzhen Special Zone Daily (March 26th, 1992). For a fuller account, particularly Deng’s talks at Wuchang and Changsha, see Wu and Yu (2008). Deng’s talks appear as “Excepts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3. See also Wong and Zheng (2001).

41. Deng Xiaoping (1992), “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3.

42. “Unknown Stories during Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour,” provided by Xinhua, accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2008-09/27/content_10119788.htm.

43. Ibid.

44. Deng Xiaoping (1992), “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Deng had long held this pragmatic view of socialism. When hosting a political leader from Africa in the early 1980s, Deng told his visitor, “I would recommend that you do not practice socialism, but rather concentrate on economic development. Once the economy is developed, the people’s living conditions improved, and they are satisfied, you can call it whatever ism you like.” These words were deemed too radical to be included in the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. See Daozheng Du (2008).

48. Deng Xiaoping (1992), “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Jiyun Tian (2004). For a collection of Tian’s articles on reform, see Tian (2009).

52. For internal political debates in early 1992 after Deng’s southern tour, see Jisheng Yang (2004), pp. 476–517; Fewsmith (2008), pp. 68–72.

53. People’s Daily (April 14th, 1992).

54. Licheng Ma (2008), pp. 158–159.

55. Ibid., p. 156.

56. Deng Xiaoping (1992), “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3.

57. Mao Zedong (1967), in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. I, p. 380.

58. Licheng Ma (2005), p. 194.

59. Ibid., p. 201.

60. Ibid., p. 199.

61. Peng and Chen (2008), pp. 400–403.

62. This is the title of Jiang’s speech at the Party Congress. For a full text of the speech, see http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/29/content_363504.htm

63. Peng and Chen (2008), p. 409.

64. Ibid.

65. Jisheng Yang (1998), pp. 356–361.

66. See Shanda Xu (2008), pp. 525–537. Originally, the Minister of Finance only allowed the income tax to be subject to negotiation under the managerial responsibility system – the turnover tax was still controlled directly by the Minister. But when the managerial responsibility system was implemented, the State Council was not diligent in enforcing the rules. For example, the contract signed by Beijing Capital Steel Corporation, approved by the State Council, included clauses on both income tax and turnover tax.

67. For a detailed analysis of China’s tax system before and after the 1994 reform, see Jiwei Lou (1998).

68. Jisheng Yang (1998), p. 426.

69. Peng and Chen (2008), pp. 441–445.

70. Ibid., pp. 445–450.

71. Jinglian Wu (2005), pp. 269–274; (2010), ch. 7.

72. Jiwei Lou (2008), p. 334.

73. We thank Weibing Zhou for pointing us to the information on product tax; Zhou worked at a county tax bureau in the early 1990s. We are responsible for the interpretation.

74. Zhang and Yuan (2008), p. 79; Peng and Chen (2008), p. 515.

75. Zhang and Yuan (2008), p. 81.

76. The calculation was made based on data provided by Li Wu (1999), p. 1525.

77. This idea first appeared in Coase (1959). This was the version of Coase Theorem that Steven Cheung stressed and introduced to the Chinese readers. See Cheung (2009).

78. The story of Chen Guang was widely known in China. See, for example, Licheng Ma (2005), pp. 203–208.

79. Wenkui Zhang and Dongming Yuan (2008), p. 113.

80. Licheng Ma (2008), p. 175.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., p. 176.

83. We thank Professor Chenggang Xu of the University of Hong Kong for this information; Xu was then at London School of Economics and was directly involved in arranging for Shanghai officials to visit several Western European countries to learn their practice of state assets management.

84. This episode was revealed to us by Professor Chenggang Xu in his comments (April 7th, 2010) on an early version of the book.

85. Peng and Chen (2008), p. 460.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid., p. 463.

88. We thank Professor Xiqing Zhu of Changsha University of Science and Technology and Mr. Xiaoming Liu, who was Vice Mayor of Changsha for the information. Both Zhu and Liu attended the 2008 Chicago Conference on China’s Economic Transformation. See Xiaoming Liu (2008).

89. Zhang and Yuan (2008), pp. 132–138.

90. See Riedel, Jin, and Gao (2007) for a systematic analysis of China’s financial system in the course of Chinese market transformation. An important reason for the underdevelopment of China’s stock market is the rise of state assets exchange centers. In 2009, the total value of assets that were transacted at such centers reached 500 billion yuan; this was way higher than the combined amount of capital raised at Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. For an updated account of the development of the state assets exchange market in China, see Heping Cao (2009).

91. The homepage of the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission provides updated information about the agent itself, relevant policies, and state enterprises under its jurisdiction: http://www.sasac.gov.cn.

92. Jiantang Ma (2008), p. 356.

93. A challenging task of the Commission today is to oversee the state assets exchange market. Given the tremendous and still growing size of state assets – by the end of 2010, the total assets of 120 enterprises controlled by the central government reached 24 trillion yuan, representing a 16 percent growth over the previous year – how efficiently this market operates has a critical impact on the overall performance of the economy. The data were retrieved from the website of the Commission on December 20th, 2011.

94. This is confirmed by a detailed empirical study (Gan, Guo, and Xu (2010)) based on a nationwide firm survey on China’s privatization in the period of 2002 to 2006. The study shows that privatized enterprises that later went through restructuring, such as changing core management teams, adopting international accounting standards and professional independent auditing, and establishing boards of directors, had significantly improved corporate performance, while privatized firms that did not undertake restructuring measures performed poorly.

95. Schumpeter (1942), p. 84. For a recent biography of Schumpeter and his lasting contribution to economics, see McCraw (2007).

96. Cheung (2009).

97. Coase (1937).

98. For a preliminary effort, see Coase and Wang (2011).

99. The following descriptions of industrial parks are mainly based on Ning Wang’s fieldwork in Zhejiang, Shanghai, Anhui, Guangdong, Fujian, Hubei, Jiangsu, Hunan, Sichuan, and Beijing. See Douglas Zeng (2011) for a recent review of the critical part played by industrial parks in China’s market transformation.

100. The updated full list of China Economic and Technological Development Zones can be found at the website of the Minister of Commerce, accessed on February 3rd, 2012, at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/xglj/kaifaqu.shtml.

101. e.g., Coase and Wang (2011).

102. Marshall (1920), p. 115.

103. Oi (1992); Lin (1995).

104. See Thun (2006) for the rise of Shanghai in China’s auto industry.

105. Yasheng Huang (2003), p. 261.

106. Tang (2009).

107. Marshall (1920), p. 221.

108. The best known article in the literature is probably Montinola, Qian, and Weingast (1995); see also Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2005) for an update. For various critiques, see Cai and Treisman (2005, 2006) and Tao and Yang (2008). See Chenggang Xu (2009) for an updated and more sophisticated reformulation of the decentralization argument.

109. Sachs (1994), p. 6.

110. Deng Xiaoping, Interview with Mike Wallace (September 2nd, 1986), Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3.

111. This logic is stressed by Qian and Xu (1993).

112. For a detailed and insightful analysis of this political system, see Chenggang Xu (2009).

113. e.g., Yasheng Huang (2003), p. 20.

114. “China’s Auto Sales Run Hot,” Wall Street Journal (October 23rd, 2010).

6 From Capitalism to Capitalisms

1. Coase (2008), Concluding speech at the 2008 Chicago Conference on China’s Economic Transformation.

2. Elliott (2008).

3. In Hinton (1982), p. 462.

4. Ferguson (1980 [1767]), p. 122. Ferguson’s original formulation is “the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design.” It was Hayek (1967), ch. 6 who popularized the phrase, “the result of human action but not of human design.”

5. In Hinton (1982), p. 459.

6. In his recent book on the rise and fall of communism, Brown (2009) concurs: “how little it revealed about a particular person to be told that the individual was a Communist” (p. 1). For a general exposition of the fluidity and complexity of identity, see Sen (2006).

7. See, for example, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and Sachs (1992). For a review of the relevant literature on gradualism versus shock therapy, see Roland (2002). Gradualism proposes optimal sequencing in contrast with the big bang approach. Both sides take economic transition as a technical problem and fail to recognize transition as essentially a Hayekian economic problem (Hayek 1945).

8. Hayek (1988). What makes socialism a “fatal conceit” is the belief that scientific socialism calls for a thorough eradication of traditions on the one hand and a complete redesign of social institutions on the other, thus enabling a rationalistic reconstruction of human society from scratch. Similar intellectual hubris was discernible in the dominant economic thinking on transition in the 1990s.

9. Hayek (1974). “The Pretense of Knowledge,” the Nobel Prize Lecture.

10. Hu Yaobang interview with L’Unità (September 30th, 1984), Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), No. 194 (October 10th, 1984).

11. The following is based on Ri Yu (2002) , which has attracted a lot of attention in China, partly because Wang Zhen later became a dogged opponent of Hu Yaobang and his liberal policy.

12. Ibid.

13. For recent discussions on the resilience of the Party and the Chinese state, see Dali Yang (2004) and Shambaugh (2008). For a critical assessment, see Pei (2006).

14. Xuewei Chen (2004).

15. e.g., Li Wu (1999), pp. 828–830 and Donglian Xiao (2008), pp. 541–544.

16. Xuewei Chen (2004).

17. Donglian Xiao (2004) began his entry, an otherwise solid and carefully researched article, by stating that “China’s reform was launched through a top-down fashion” (p. 185). Naughton (2008) also called the initial approach of reform “top down” (p. 100).

18. Jinglian Wu (2005), p. 64.

19. E.g., Jiang Zemin’s Report at the Fourteenth Party Congress (1992). Available at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/29/content_363504.htm.

20. Deng Xiaoping, “We Regard Reform as a Revolution,” talk on October 10th, 1984, with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3.

21. In Hinton (1982), p. 460.

22. Ibid.

23. Deng Xiaoping, “We Regard Reform as a Revolution,” talk on October 10th, 1984, with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3.

24. Zhao Ziyang’s report on government work, Xinhua General News Service, May 31st, 1984.

25. Cheung (1982).

26. The consistent efforts of North (1981, 1990, and 2005) stand out as one of the few exceptions. But we are still far away from a dynamic theory of institutional change. See also Greif (2006); North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009); Kuran (2010); Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)

27. The literature on path dependence is a noticeable exception, e.g., Arthur (1994); Mahoney (2000); David (2001); and Pierson (2004). For a recent critical review of the literature, see Vergne and Durand (2010). Desjardins (2011) offers a critique from the perspective of evolutionary biology.

28. See, for example, Ziyang Zhao (2009), pp. 119–124.

29. Peng and Chen (2008), p. 280.

30. Lin and Yao (2001).

31. Kornai (1979, 1980, 1986) first introduced the concept of “soft budget constraint.” For more recent reviews, see Maskin (1996, 1999) as well as Maskin and Xu (2001).

32. Zhang and Yuan (2008), p. 89.

33. For a recent review of the literature, see Chenggang Xu (2009); see also Cheung (2009) and Sheng (2010).

34. Oi (1992); Walder (1995). See also Nee (1992).

35. For a classic defense of the minimum state, see Nozick (1974).

36. The continuous presence of the state in defining and redefining property rights has raised a serious challenge. The discretionary power that the Chinese state still holds undermines the credibility of China’s emerging private property rights. Since the power can be and has been abused by government officials, it remains a big hurdle for the Chinese government to protect private property rights that has been recognized by the new constitution since 2004.

37. See, for example, a book review by Levinston (2010), that is simply titled “China’s Authoritarian Capitalism Undermines Western Values” Washington Post (May 30th), accessed at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/28/AR2010052801859.html. The three books reviewed are Halper (2010); Bremmer (2010); and Kampfner (2010).

38. Baumol, Litan, and Shramm (2007). But the authors are quite skeptical of the common claim that China is a “quintessential state-guided economy” (p. 145).

39. Yasheng Huang (2008), p. 236.

40. The Chinese economist Wu Jinglian first coined the term in 1998, which is meant to criticize the economic privilege of political power. See Xiaobo Wu (2010), p. 196.

41. Dingxin Zhao (2009).

42. See http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2604/2606/t15288.htm.

43. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/12/content_7966431.htm.

44. Madsen, talk given at a panel held at the University of California at San Diego on October 1st, 2009, to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BgckHmsghmc.

45. See, for example, Short (1999), pp. 101–105.

46. As Short (1999) put it, for Mao, “Chinese culture was still the foundation on which everything else had to be built – and would remain so for the rest of his life” (p. 103).

47. As Mao admitted later, “I read and re-read them [Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao] by heart. I worshiped Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao.” Quoted from Spence (1999), p. 9.

48. As Kang Chao (1986) stated, China had a specific form of “market economy for more than two millennia before the 1950’s,” which he called the “atomistic market economy” (p. 5). Hill Gates (1996) referred to it as “a thousand years of petty capitalism.” For the history of capitalist development in China since the late Ming period, see the three volumes edited by Xu and Wu (2007).

49. The Travels of Marco Polo (translated by Henry Yule 1923).

50. For a readily accessible introduction to Confucianism, including its development over time, see Yao (2000). For an early assessment of the fate of Confucianism in modern China, see Levenson (1968).

51. Fogel (2010). For a more elaborated argument, see Fogel (2006). For a recent and sophisticated prediction, see Subramanian (2011).

52. Nicholas Consonery (January 7th, 2010), “A 123 Trillion China? Not Likely,” appeared on the online edition of Foreign Policy.

53. Adam Smith (1969 [1759]), pp. 380–381.

54. The late Chicago economist, D. Gale Johnson (1994, 1999) had persistently criticized the economic reasoning behind China’s one-child policy.

55. See http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009/countries/China.html.

56. See http://finance.eastday.com/m/20100525/u1a5224725.html.

57. For a critical analysis of the role of state-owned enterprises in the Chinese economy, see a recent working paper done by the Unirule Institute of Economics (2011).

58. Xiaolu Wang (2007); see also a study conducted by the Unirule Institute of Economics (2011), particularly ch. 4.

59. Yang Shang (1928), pp. 331–333.

60. Master Shen (Shen Zi), “Yi Wen.” See Qiu Hanping (or Henry H. P. Chiu), “Shenzi de Falu Shixiang” [The Legal Thoughts of Master Shen], originally appeared in Faxue Jikan [Law Quarterly] 3 (1927), reproduced in He and Li (2003), pp. 343–344.

61. E.g., Durkheim (1982), pp. 50–59. See also Berger and Luckmann (1966). Searle refers to them as “institutional facts” in contrast to “brute facts” (1969), pp. 50–52.

62. Hayek (1948), p. 60.

63. There are as many as eight different Chinese translations available. This edition was translated by Tang Risong (2004).

64. Ibid., “Translator’s introduction,” p. 8.

65. Ibid., “Translator’s introduction,” pp. 4–5.

66. Interview with Wen Jiabao by Financial Times (February 2nd, 2009), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/795d2bca-f0fe-11dd-8790-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1CqDI0Ten.

67. Ibid.

68. Interview with Wen Jiaobao by Fareed Zakaria, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2008/09/28/we-should-join-hands.html.

69. Wen’s comments on Adam Smith were widely discussed on the internet, e.g., http://book.163.com/special/009242BF/guanyuan.html.

70. Adam Smith (1969 [1759]), pp. 167–168.

71. Ibid., p. 517.

72. e.g., Zhiping Liang (2010). For a different assessment, see Whyte (2010).

73. Adam Smith (1976 [1776]), Book V, p. 232.

74. Adam Smith (1976 [1776]), Book I, p. 88.

75. e.g., Ren (1997); Xiaohong Ma (1997, 2004).

76. Knight (1976), p. 43.

77. Cheung (1982, 1986).

78. See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf.

79. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf

80. Ffrench (1950), p. 203.

81. See http://moneywatch.bnet.com/economic-news/blog/macro-view/manufacturing-surprise-the-us-still-leads-in-making-things/2134/.

82. See, for example, Deng Xiaoping’s speech at the opening ceremony of the National Conference of Science on March 18th, 1978. It is available in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2.

83. “China’s Great Leap Forward in Higher Education,” Asia Times (July 3rd, 2002).

84. A Google search of “Qian Xuesen zhi Wen” (Qian Xuesen Puzzle)” generated 542,000 responses (February 2nd, 2011).

85. See Ryan (2010) for a discussion of recent development in China’s higher education.

86. “Nan Keda Did Not Receive Approval after Three and Half Years of Preparation,” People’s Daily (October 20th, 2010).

87. The Communiqué, in Hinton (1982), p. 461.

88. Ibid.

89. This quote is from Deng’s talk given on December 13th, 1979, to government leaders. Quoted from Raphael Shen (2000), p. ix.

90. Deng Xiaoping’s conviction that “development is the hard truth” remains the core foundation of the political legitimacy of the Party. For scholarly treatment on China’s performance-based political legitimacy, see Lynn White (2005); Dingxin Zhao (2009).

91. Popper (1978).

92. For an account of the rise of political associations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see Yu-fa Chang (1982, 2004).

93. This old political credo is attributed to Confucius; it exhorts the ruler to take an impartial stand and serve the public welfare. It is unfortunate that it has been misunderstood as a call for public ownership. As stressed by Shang Yang and Master Shen (see pp. 182–83) as well as modern property rights economics, it is not public ownership but clearly delineated property rights that offer the best chance to secure and advance the interests of the general public.

94. Mao once wrote the poem to Fu Ssu-nian in 1945 upon the latter’s request for his calligraphy. Fu and Mao had knew each other since their days at Peking University when Fu was a prominent student leader and Mao, a library assistant; but Mao “had always been denied inclusion in discussion groups with Fu” Fan-sen Wang (2000), p. 170.

95. For a classic account of the problems of bureaucracy, see Simon (1997 [1947]).

96. For an insightful exposition and powerful defense of the market for ideas and the free pursuit of knowledge, see Polanyi (1951, 1958). See also Coase (1974).

97. Mu Qian, one of the best known Chinese historians in the twentieth century, called traditional China a “shi-run government” (2001), p. 15 or “shi-centered society” (2010), p. 80. Balazs (1964) agreed with Qian on facts regarding the role of shi in Chinese history, but offered a more critical interpretation. The scholar-officials’ state, according to Balazs, “was so strong that the merchant class never dared to fight it openly in order to extract from it liberties, laws, and autonomy for themselves” (p. 23). See also note 33.

98. Hayek (1973), p. 2 went even further to warn us that “the predominant model of liberal democratic institutions, . . . necessarily leads to a gradual transformation of the spontaneous order of a free society into a totalitarian system conducted in the service of some coalition of organized interests” (italic added).

99. John Dunn (2005) provides an illuminating account of the rise of democracy from “parochial eccentricity and protracted ignominy” (p.18) to become “a single worldwide name for the legitimate basis of political authority (p. 15). Rather than election or multi-party competition, democracy is identified by Dunn as “the name for political authority exercised solely through the persuasion of the greater number” (p. 132). But a free market for ideas is indispensable for any genuine persuasion.

100. For an insightful exposition of the logic of liberty, see Polanyi (1951) and Hayek (1960).

101. However, about one hundred days later the statue was removed, with little explanation given by the authority. This incident reveals certain hesitation and even resistance to China’s return to its own cultural roots. Tradition, as T. S. Eliot (1932) put it well, “cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labor” (p. 14). In renewing its own cultural traditions, China has to overcome layers of intellectual barriers and ideological apprehensions left by radical anti-traditionalism and revolutionary ideology that had dominated the Chinese minds since the dawn of the twentieth century. For an elaborate discussion of the critical role of tradition in human society, see Shils (1981).